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Pursuant to this Court's Minute Entry dated January 6, 1992, 
plaintiffs-appellees (,fSteelcofl) respond as follows to the Reply 
Brief of defendants-appellants ("defendants") dated November 27, 
1991. 
General Comment. As in their Opening Brief, defendants in 
their Reply generally offer testimony favorable to their position 
and ignore the evidence supporting the trial court's decision. 
Defendants' Reply repeatedly notes that factual statements in the 
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argument portion of Steelco's Brief have no record references, 
but record references for all factual assertions appear in the 
statement of facts. Defendants1 Reply advances unsupported and 
inaccurate statements as to the evidence and record; space 
constraints do not permit discussion of all those inaccuracies. 
The underscored introductions below identify the portions of 
defendants1 Reply that are the subject of discussion: 
Introduction (pp.2-3). Contrary to defendants1 suggestion, 
Steelco's Brief contains no personal attacks upon (nor even a 
single mention of) defendants' counsel. Steelco's Brief does 
accurately state that defendants were "misleading this Court11 in 
claiming that the trial judge was hostile towards them. A review 
of defendants1 claim of Judge Russon's hostility (Opening Brief, 
p.46 n.6) and the record references contained therein will 
demonstrate that defendants are indeed misleading this Court as 
to this irresponsible and unsupported claim. Defendants1 claim 
that Steelco's statement of facts is filled with improper "pejor-
ative, exaggeration and argument" is completely unfounded. 
At page 3, footnote 1, defendants offer these examples: 
Steelco's (i) use of terms such as "vast" and "huge" for about 
475,000 pounds of steel [Steelco Opening Brief, pp.47-48], (ii) 
referring to "remnant" (as everyone did throughout trial and the 
trial court specifically did in its Memorandum Decision), (iii) 
referring to ''kickbacks*' (as Heaton, Chris Williams, and the 
court did in its Memorandum Decision at R275), (iv) references to 
"bargain prices" (the court found that defendants paid a "frac-
tion of the true value" at R277) and "fraudulently inflated" (the 
trial court in its Memorandum Decision at R275 found that the 
steel was sold "at the inflated price" based upon a fraud). 
Defendants also inaccurately state that Steelco's generalization 
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The limitation issue (p.5), Defendants state that their 
objections addressed limitations as to all of the conversion, 
fraud, and conspiracy claims, citing R305-08. There, only 
conversion is mentioned -- "fraud11 and "conspiracy11 are not. 
The discovery rule (pp.5-8). At page 6, defendants remark-
ably suggest that the discovery rule does not apply to the 
limitations period for a fraud case. Section 78-12-26(3) provides 
that the limitations period does not begin "until the discovery 
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud." 
Defendants1 statement at page 7 that they "did nothing to conceal 
the claim from Steelco" ignores the trial court's findings and 
ignores the evidence of concealment advanced at pages 49-52 and 
57-61 of Steelcofs Opening Brief. Contrary to defendants1 
suggestion, Hurst did refuse to speak with Elkington until he had 
first spoken with his attorney. [R452 at 130.] At page 7, 
defendants claim that Elkington "never returned to review records 
from earlier years which were more difficult to locate," citing 
R454 at 94-98. There, Hurst testified that Elkington asked for 
records concerning 1983 and 1984, but Hurst (i) couldn't locate 
them and (ii) wouldn't release them without Heaton's permission. 
In his deposition, Hurst flatly contradicted his trial testimony 
by stating that Elkington never even asked to see records for 
1984 or prior to 1985. [R454, p.156.] Hurst never testified 
that Hurst and Heaton always met behind closed doors, which never 
happened with anyone other than Hurst is "not supported by tHe 
record." That exact testimony is found at R452 pp.26, 79-80. 
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that he told Elkington the records were available or would be 
made available, as defendants suggest. Elkington testified that 
he asked for information for years prior to 1985 but that Hurst 
stated f,that such information was no longer available.M [R452 at 
134.] The trial court believed Elkington. At page 8, defendants 
attempt to show that Heaton, not Hurst, did the concealing by 
stating that at pages 46-47 of Steelco's Brief, Heatonfs name 
appears many times and Wasatch Steel and Hurst are only infre-
quently mentioned. But the pages chosen by defendants concern, 
not concealment (as defendants suggest), but rather when Steelco 
discovered the thefts and kickbacks. Defendants1 concealment is 
addressed at pages 49-52 and, by incorporation, pages 57-61. 
There, Hurst and Wasatch Steel are mentioned about fifty times in 
connection with their multiple acts of concealment. Defendants 
state "the brief recites that Heaton did this, and Heaton did 
that. It does not show anything that Mr. Hurst did or said.11 
[Reply Brief at 8.] Pages 49-52 of Steelco's Brief and, by 
incorporation, pages 57-61, show a great deal that Mr. Hurst did 
and said, including (i) his agreement to keep Heatonfs thefts and 
his kickbacks a secret, (ii) his arrangement to cut checks to 
Steelco for portions of the delivered materials to mislead 
Steelco to believe it was being paid for all, (iii) his exclu-
sively after-hour dealings exclusively with Heaton exclusively 
behind closed doors, (iv) his nondisclosure to Steelco of the 
multiple bribes he paid even though he recognized that it was a 
"sleazy practice" and that he as an employer would want to know 
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such information, and (v) his evasive and dishonest response to 
Elkingtonfs investigation and his confirmation of a phony low 
number representing the magnitude of Heatonfs thefts. Steelco's 
Brief contains much more. 
The issue was presented (p.9). Defendants state that their 
"counsel did try to present the argument11 that the Utah Joint 
Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4, bars recovery in this 
case, citing R451 at 42-62. There, counsel and the court discuss 
only the admissibility of two documents; defendants' counsel made 
no such argument and did not even mention this defense or statute. 
The settlement agreement (pp.12-13). Defendants state that 
"Elkington was told that the 1983 and 1984 records would be made 
available at a more convenient time and with Heaton's authoriza-
tion....11 The record citation given (R454 at 97-98) does not 
2 
support that statement. Hurst never stated that he would make 
additional records available at a more convenient time. 
Footnote 4 on page 13 is a careful effort to suggest that 
Heaton testified that he told Elkington about the commissions 
before the Settlement Agreement and then changed his testimony 
after a recess was "forfuitously" called. Heaton first testified 
At those pages, Hurst testified that he wasn't sure whether 
there were earlier transactions (p.97, lines 3-7) and that Hurst 
couldn't produce them (p.97, lines 11-17). Hurst also testified 
that Elkington never asked to see the pre 1985 records. [R454, 
p. 156.] Elkington unequivocally testified that Hurst told him 
that the information for years prior to 1985 "was no longer 
available." [R452 at 134.] 
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t n at "I can't remember the exact time when it was, but it was 
before or at the time." [R451 at 124.] The underscored language 
was conveniently deleted from defendants* quote. The recess was 
called by the court. After the recess, as defendants' counsel 
continued his examination, Heaton stated that he was unsure 
whether he discussed commissions in connection with the Settle-
ment Agreement or the later rescission of the Settlement Agree-
ment. [R451 at 125-26.] Heaton warranted in the Settlement 
Agreement that all unlawful activities were disclosed therein (no 
kickbacks were mentioned); Elkington testified that he learned of 
the kickbacks after the Settlement Agreement was executed. [R452 
at 147.] 
Defendants did not know (pp.18-26). At page 19, defendants 
assert that Heaton's requests of Hurst not to say anything to 
Steelco "were not made in the course of the sale of the remnant 
or scrap cuttings but are supposed to have been made in the 
course of the sale of material from the South Yard in 1986....," 
citing R451 at 8, 14, 16-19. At pages 7-8, Heaton testified that 
twenty or twenty-five such conversations occurred and that he 
could not fix with precision the date of any of those conversa-
tions. He did not state that they did not relate to the sale of 
remnant. Pages 14 and 16-19 contain no reference to any such 
conversations. At R451 p.77, however, Heaton testified that he 
told Hurst "that Steelco mustn't know about it on practically 
every occasion of our dealings." At page 20, defendants claim 
that whether the steel was stolen was never discussed after 
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Heaton initially indicated to Hurst that the steel was his to 
sell. A review of R451 at 80 will reflect that the subject did 
come up: One of Hurst's employees once stated, a few months 
after Heaton began dealing with Hurst, that the material looked 
like it was "high rate stuff!f -- meaning "hot or stolen.11 In 
addition to the incomplete material quoted at pages 52-53 of 
defendants1 Reply Brief, one must review R451 pp. 76-77 -- Heaton 
testified that the subject came up "every time I sold it" and 
that on practically every occasion, Hurst was told that their 
dealings must be kept secret. 
At page 21, defendants suggest that Heaton initially paid 
Steelco for the subject steel. The record citation (R451 at 
96-99) merely indicates that Heaton paid Steelco for a very 
limited number of loads of steel, not that he paid for the steel 
he resold to defendants. Heaton testified that he paid a total 
of only $200-$300 for steel, that such steel was for his personal 
use, and that he paid for none of the steel listed on Exhibits 
1-5 (for which recovery was awarded). [R450 at 202-03; R451 at 
90.] Defendants state at the top of page 21 that "Plaintiffs 
have no answer for the fact that, when Heaton started the process 
of buying and selling, his purchases were authorized,1' citing 
references at page 10 of their Opening Brief. The record does 
indicate that a very few, very small purchases by Heaton were 
authorized, but all of the testimony was that Heaton was not 
authorized to purchase any material for resale. Only purchases 
for his personal use were authorized. [R450 at 126-28; 195-96.] 
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The record does not show that Heaton was ever authorized to "buy 
and sell" the same steel. At pages 21-22, defendants claim that 
the record does not support the fact that virtually all deliveries 
were after Steelcofs hours (as the trial court specifically found 
in its Memorandum Decision [R276]). Steelco's business hours 
concluded at 3:30; however, there was a second shift in Heaton's 
department (a block away from the office), which was not super-
vised by anyone but Heaton. Heaton made almost all of his 
deliveries between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. or on Saturdays. [R451 at 
100-05.] 
At page 22, defendants argue that their refusal to make 
information available to Steelco's management was perfectly 
normal, but that is completely inconsistent with defendants' 
claim that they believed Heaton's dealings with Steelco were 
completely authorized. At page 23, defendants state that "no 
records whatsoever were withheld" from Elkington. Elkington 
testified, on the other hand, that although he asked to see 
Wasatch Steel's records for years prior to 1985, Hurst said "such 
information was no longer available." [R452 at 134.] Defendants 
then claim that Steelcofs assertion that the "only records 
Elkington saw were those hand picked by Hurst" is "absolutely not 
true." Elkington testified that when he arrived at Wasatch 
Steel's offices, Hurst had already segregated the receipts that 
he showed Elkington from his other records. [R452 at 133.] 
Hurst did not deny this. 
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Evidence of conspiracy (pp. 27-28). At the bottom of page 
27, defendants state that "there is no evidence whatever" of 
Hurst's lying to Elkington about unavailability of part of his 
records and that Elkington "was never told they [records for 
earlier years] did not exist or would not be produced." Elkington 
testified: 
After reviewing the receipts for 1985, I also believed 
that we had not yet seen everything. At that point I 
walked down the stairs ... and I told Mr. Hurst I would 
like to see earlier years' information. And at that 
time he told me that such information was no longer 
available. [R452 at 134.] *"" 
Information for 1983 and 1984 was available, contrary to Mr. 
Hurst's false statement. [Exs. 1-P and 2-P.] Defendants next 
claim that "there is no evidence whatever" of any agreement 
between Hurst and Heaton to confirm a phony amount of purchases. 
Here is the evidence: After Elkington discovered the thefts, and 
before Elkington spoke with Hurst, Heaton spoke with Hurst. 
[R450 at 101.] During that conversation, Heaton asked Hurst not 
to reveal all of his dealings with Heaton. [R450 at 101-02.] 
Heaton then gave Elkington a letter in which he indicated that he 
and Hurst had found that "he [Hurst] had paid me a total of 
$9,185.85" and that "if you like please call Lynn and he can 
confirm this amount." [Ex. 20-P; R452 at 130.] After receiving 
that letter, Elkington contacted Hurst and asked him whether the 
amount of his dealings with Wasatch Steel was $9,100, approxi-
mately, and asked Hurst if that was accurate. Elkington testified 
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that Hurst stated "he said he thought it was.11 [R452 at 132.] 
In fact, the amount was over four times that sum. [Ex. 27-P.] 
The commissions (pp.29-32). Defendants characteristically 
ignore all evidence but the testimony of Hurst. The court found 
that Hurst paid at least eleven kickbacks, not four. [R358 161.] 
Heaton testified that Hurst paid him at least four kickbacks in 
addition to the four admitted by Hurst, for a total of at least 
eight kickbacks to Heaton. [Ex. 13-P; R451 at 26-30.] Hurst 
admitted paying four kickbacks, but he also testified that he did 
not know whether the remaining four to Heaton were or were not 
kickbacks. [R450 at 94-100.] The eight Heaton kickbacks and 
their compelling mathematical relationship to Steelco's contem-
poraneous purchases are summarized on Exhibit 28-P. Chris 
Williams testified that she received at least three kickbacks 
from Hurst. [R451 at 169.] On page 30, defendants again incor-
rectly state that Elkington was shown everything that he requested 
3 
and sought nothing more than he received at Wasatch Steel. 
Elkington also inquired whether anyone other than Heaton was 
involved. Hurst responded negatively, although that was false 
(Chris Williams was also involved in both steel deliveries and 
kickbacks). [R452 at 135; R450 at 106-07.] Although Hurst 
admitted that it would have been important for Elkington to know 
about the kickbacks, Hurst never told Elkington about them. 
See discussion at pages 3-4 above. 
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[R454 at 157-59.] At page 30, defendants argue that Steelco 
cannot fairly complain about the "roughness11 of the material that 
it received through the kickback transactions. Hurst admitted 
that Heaton told him "I need some commission [a kickback] to get 
them [Steelco] to use this rough of material." [R454 at 152-54.] 
Steelcofs complaint with the roughness of the material is that 
Hurst bribed its employees to induce them to cause Steelco to pay 
inflated prices for unusable or unsuitable junk -- the subject 
materials were not suitable for their intended purpose. [Exs. 
35-P - 44-P; R452 at 80-94.] 
At page 31, defendants, using selective citations to the 
record, attempt to avoid the impact of Hurst's production at 
trial of records that he claimed in his deposition had been 
stolen at the end of 1987 (coincidentally just after Hurst 
learned that Steelco was investigating Heaton1s dealings with 
Wasatch Steel). [R454 at 120-26.] The thrust of defendants1 
argument is that Hurst only indicated that his journals of cash 
transactions were stolen, but never indicated that other records 
were stolen. Defendants mischaracterize the record. Mr. Hurst 
testified in his deposition that all of his cash records for 1986 
were stolen -- "everything.11 In addition, Steelcofs Request for 
Production of Documents to defendants requested in paragraph 13 
"Q: What records does Wasatch Steel have that shows cash 
receipts and disbursements during 1986? A: Cash receipts and 
disbursements? Q: Yes. A: Our entire books, our entire set of 
books were stolen at the end of -- what did I tell -- '87. Mr. 
Garrett: You will have to answer the question the best you can. 
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all documents that you intend to introduce into evidence at the 
trial of this action." [R66.] Neither Ex. 53-D nor the cash 
records summarized therein were ever produced. At trial, Hurst 
testified that he researched his "records" for March 1986 through 
July of 1986 and determined daily cash deposits, from which he 
compiled Exhibit 53-D. [R454 at 119-20.] Thus, when Hurst's 
counsel asked him about records detailing cash transactions, he 
was able to locate and utilize his records. During his deposi-
tion, when he was asked about the same "records," he claimed 
they -- "everything" -- had been stolen. Defendants' remarkable 
response is that Steelco should have obtained the "stolen" 
records from another source and that the trial court should not 
have been concerned about Mr. Hurst's contradictory testimony! 
The superintendent's authority. At page 35, defendants 
again diligently attempt to suggest to this Court that Heaton had 
express authority to buy and then resell the steel in question. 
As demonstrated above, everyone testified that Heaton had no 
authority to purchase steel for resale and Heaton himself testi-
fied that all of the steel for which Steelco achieved recovery in 
this case was stolen. Defendants confuse authority to sell 
material for Steelco, on the one hand, and the obvious absence of 
authority to steal material from Steelco and resell it for 
Heaton's own personal benefit, on the other hand. 
A: And I don't have any records detailing cash transactions. Q: 
For what periodV A; For '8b. like you askecT Q: Do you have any 
for prior periods? A: No. * * * Q; What Tecords were stolen? 
A: Everything " R454 pp. 122-23. 
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Heaton was a thief. At pages 36-37, defendants argue that a 
person who obtains property by fraud can transfer good title to a 
bona fide purchaser and that, therefore, there can be no conver-
sion here. However, all the steel was indisputably stolen. 
[R337-38.] Defendants concede that a thief cannot pass good 
title. Defendants inaccurately argue that they did not receive 
credit for the full value of the scrap given to Heaton. Exhibits 
30 and 31 (R368-74) demonstrate that the court gave a credit 
[ftest. value of scrap fabricated beams given to Heaton11] of the 
amount paid for scrap on the fraud claim (value to Steelco) and 
double that amount on the conversion claim (retail value). See 
Ex. 27; R341 at 122; R452 at 164-65. 
At page 37, defendants suggest that the trial court did not 
properly account for the steel that was paid for by or given to 
Heaton. That the trial court did so is demonstrated at pages 
12-14 of Steelcofs Opening Brief. Heaton paid only $200-$300 to 
Steelco for materials and they were for his personal use. [R450 
at 202-03; R451 at 90.] All of the steel for which Steelco 
recovered was stolen. [R450 at 201-05.] Defendants state that 
Heaton made cash payments for which Steelco kept no record. The 
record does not support that statement. At best, the record 
shows that Heaton may have made some payments in 1983, but 
Steelco had no receipts earlier than 1984. Heaton conceded that 
his earliest purchases may have been in 1984. [R451 at 100, 
138.] Heaton claimed to have paid Steelco $200-$300, and Steelco 
had invoices for Heaton's purchases totaling $400 -- a close 
correlation. [Ex. 16-P; R452 at 136-37.] 
The damage award. At page 40, defendants claim that Heaton 
did not sell mainly remnant material to Wasatch Steel. Hurst 
testified that his intention was to purchase new remnant material 
that could be resold, rather than scrap. [R450 at 40-41.] 
Heaton testified that the material he sold to Wasatch Steel was 
almost exclusively remnant, not scrap. [R450 at 202-03; R117.] 
The court found that the steel was "almost all remnant material." 
[R337 at 18.] Defendants next claim that there is no record 
support for the assertion that the remnant steel that was stolen 
was taken from remnant racks where it was placed to be reused as 
new steel by Steelco. Heaton testified that the stolen steel was 
generally new steel left after cutting a new piece of steel for a 
customer (i.e., remnant). [R450 at 202-03.] Remnant was stored 
separately from the scrap -- in designated locations inside the 
shop and sometimes outside. [R451 at 87-89.] Scrap was deposited 
in special scrap tubs; remnant was deposited in racks to be used 
at a future time. [R450 at 118-22.] Defendants are wrong. 
The punitive damage award (pp. 41-44). Here, defendants 
ignore their own outrageous conduct. Instead, defendants claim 
that the damage award in this case will destroy Wasatch (a fact 
that was not found by the court and is not supported by the 
record). Defendants fault Steelco for coming to them for 
Hurst testified that Wasatch Steel might be worth a million 
dollars [R454 at 32-33] and that Wasatch Steel makes about $9,000 
payment rather than to Steelcofs insurance carrier and that 
Steelco's vigorous pursuit of this action was improper. Steelco 
can be expected to be upset by another company in the steel 
business that systematically bribes its employees and helpfully 
facilitates scores of thefts and resales of its property. The 
fact is that Wasatch Steel and Lynn Hurst systematically engaged 
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in dishonest, fraudulent, criminal , "sleazy" practices. 
Conclusion. The record supports each of the trial court's 
findings. Those findings can be overturned only if Hurst, who 
admits paying kickbacks and participating in "sleazy" practices, 
and who was impeached again and again, is believed over all the 
other witnesses, who testified consistently. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4y^&& s£ February, 1992. 
Maak, Of Counsel 
,, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants 
per month in clear profit -- in just one year Wasatch Steel makes 
more in clear profit than the court's punitive damage award. 
[R454 at 32.] 
It is uncontested that Steelco recovered nothing from any 
insurance with respect to the claims asserted in this case. 
See Opening Brief at page 84 for a list of the crimes. 
Q 
Hurst in his deposition admitted that the kickbacks were a 
"sleazy" practice. At trial, he testified, directly contrary to 
his deposition, that he approves the practice of an employee's 
receipt of secret kickbacks. The propriety of a punitive damage 
award in this case is demonstrated with transparent clarity by 
Mr. Hurst's testimony on this subject at R450 at 78-89 and R454 
at 151-59. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing "Further Response of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees to Defendants-Appellants' Reply" was served 
this 4- day of February, 1992 by hand delivering on said date 
four (4) copies thereof to: 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr., Esq. 
Gardiner & Hintze 
Attorneys for Defendants 
525 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
